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ON THE FIRST BRANCH OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
ANDREW STRAUSS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Because leaders can’t lead if followers won’t follow, the political character
of societies are determined by how citizens collectively choose to condition
their willingness to follow. They may reflexively follow the commands of
those proclaiming authority or they may subject their obedience to various
forms of moral scrutiny. In the 20th century, successfully demonstrating this
reality, Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Vaclav Havel and others
overturned political orders by inspiring millions to condition their willingness
to follow on specific normative criteria.
Citizens do not make collective determinations of when they will follow on
an ad hoc basis. In order to function effectively, societies need to
institutionalize the coordination of actions and no society has yet figured out
how do so without delegating at least limited decision-making powers. At the
level of organizing global society, citizens on matters of common global
interest have almost exclusively come to accept the obligation to follow the
legal commands of national authorities as opposed to global authorities. And,
those in democratic societies have not demanded the same opportunity to
participate in global decision-making that they have come to expect in national
decision-making.
The international institutional configuration that has resulted does not
measure up to contemporary standards of fairness and democracy. Certain
national authorities dominate the global system, and citizens with access to
those national authorities can leverage that access into tremendous influence
over the course of international events. Average citizens in less powerful
countries are, in contrast, largely powerless to influence global events. This
stark inequality of power has lead to pervasive feelings of exclusion, anger and
alienation and has no doubt become a major contemporary cause of global
tensions.
The global situation would be very different if global citizens all had an
equal vote in selecting global authorities whose legal commands they came to
follow on matters of common global concern. Then at least at the level of
formal political structure, all citizens would have a fair say in decision-making.
* Professor of International law, Widener University School of Law. I would very
much like to thank Michael Schloss for his excellent research help on this article and David
Anthony for his timely editorial assistance. I would also like to convey my appreciation to the
staff of the Widener Law Review for their superior work. The material in this article is based on
ideas I originally presented as part of my Henry Usborne Memorial Lecture delivered in the
British Houses of Parliament and published by the One World Trust. See ANDREW STRAUSS,
TAKING DEMOCRACY GLOBAL: ASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF A GLOBAL
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY (2005), http://www.oneworldtrust.org/documents/taking%2
democracy%20global.pdf.
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What I am describing, is almost universally believed to be intrinsic to domestic
democracy, a popularly elected parliament, or what, in Montesquieu’s terms,
might be thought of as the first branch of global governance.
Richard Falk and I have long argued for a global parliament. In this article
I wish to address specifically how such a global institution might be practically
instituted given present-day political realities. I compare four approaches for
bringing about such an organization. If any of the four could be successful,
the democratic principle that citizen followership should be conditioned upon
democratic leadership would be for the first time introduced into the global
system.
II. FOUR APPROACHES, BUT ONE COMMON PRINCIPLE
The one principle common to the four approaches to creating a Global
Parliamentary Assembly (GPA) is that the parliament begins initially as a
largely advisory body rather than a full-fledged legislative assembly with
binding powers. The most successful example of a popularly elected
transnational parliament is the European Parliament, and that institution of the
European Union started in the early days of European integration with only
advisory powers. Today, half a century later, it has attained for itself a
considerable role in European Union lawmaking1 and there continue to be
important proposals for further strengthening its powers.2
What we can draw from the experience with the European Parliament is
that postponing the day in which the GPA will have significant legislative
powers enhances its political viability because it encourages those who are
presently powerful to focus more on the organization’s abstract neutral
benefits than on how it might negatively impact their short-term political
interests. Of particular importance, this would apply to political leaders who
would largely be ceding to the parliament their successors powers, rather than
their own.
Starting the GPA in a modest way as an advisory body, as the price to pay
for initial political viability, does not mean that the parliament could not come
1. Since 1970 the European Parliament has, in stages, gained a considerable role in
legislative decision making within what is today the European Union. The vast majority of
decisions now require approval by the Parliament. See Wilhelm Lehmann, European Parliament
Fact Sheets 1.3.1, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/1_3_1_en.htm; Wilhelm Lehmann,
European Parliament Fact Sheets 1.3.2, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/1_3_2_en.htm.
2. The proposed European Constitution (the ratification of which was suspended
following its defeat by voters in France and the Netherlands) gave considerably enhanced
powers to the European Parliament. The growing number of countries in the European Union
is making it increasingly difficult for national leaders to reach the degree of consensus required
for decision-making. Consequently, suggestions are being forwarded that important decisions
can be better made by the European Parliament. See, e.g., Europe Info. Serv., Future of Europe:
Reinforced Cooperation Cannot Be Excluded as an Option, EUROPEAN REPORT, Feb. 9, 2007 (available
via subscription; on file with author).
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to play a central role in global governance. Even in its early days, despite the
parliament’s lack of formal powers, it would be well positioned to bring about
some measure of accountability to the global system. If, for example, it
suspected that various international organizations were engaged in malfeasance
or nonfeasance, it could hold hearings and issue reports. By virtue of being
the one popularly elected body at the global level, its reports would carry the
weight of moral authority and have a strong claim to be taken seriously. And
over the long term it is likely that the parliament would grow far beyond its
relatively humble beginnings. By virtue of its democratic legitimacy it would
be poised to assume the sorts of powers that are typical of parliaments all over
the world.
Citizen groups would likely seek to have the parliament’s moral authority
associated with their cause. For example, groups critical of existing
international economic organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank would very likely
petition the parliament to condemn various policies of those organizations.
Representatives of those organizations, or other interest groups with contrary
positions, are not likely to concede the legitimacy of the only popularly elected
global body. Rather, as is the case with national parliaments, the global
parliament would provide a political forum where the various interests would
come together, and through the intermediation of their elected representatives,
work out legislative compromise that could be formally and finally agreed
upon by the parliament. The likely result is that these global interests would
come to have a sense of ownership in the parliament, its processes and
outcomes.
As the planet’s organized citizenry began to reconfigure itself beyond the
limitations of separate and discreet orbits around national parliaments into a
new common orbit around a GPA, over time the parliaments formal powers
would likely come to reflect this new political reality. Not only would the
organized citizenry be inclined toward supporting the legal force of legislative
results that were fashioned in response to their input, but an existing
parliament could powerfully lobby governments on behalf of expanding its
own powers. In a world where democratic elections have become the litmus
test for legitimate governance at the local, provincial and national levels, the
parliament’s claim to exercise increasing authority in the name of the global
citizenry would be hard to resist.
Also furthering the parliament’s gradual increase in powers would be its
own elected representatives. Presently there is no global institution whose
constituency is the world’s citizenry. The United Nations is a society of states,
and the institutional loyalties of the representatives of those states are oriented
toward championing the prerogatives of their states, even at the expense of an
organizationally successful United Nations. The sole institutional affiliation of
those elected directly to the parliament would be the parliament, and their
professional status would be tied directly to the growth and empowerment of
the parliament.
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Perhaps the greatest reason to believe that the parliament could expand its
powers within the international system is that the system is missing a large
component of the machinery of effective governance. The international
system has no center. There is no body to coordinate, harmonize or oversee
the balkanized global bureaucracy. International organizations, whether they
deal with health, labor, trade, weapons, or other matters, are all separate
bodies, often created by independent treaties. Because it is well established in
the popular imagination that parliaments oversee agencies of government, and
there is no other candidate to play this role at the global level, the GPA would
be poised to take its central place in the international system as the vertical link
to the citizenry and the horizontal link between the various international
organizations.
Proclaiming that an initially advisory body could incrementally, through the
power of popular legitimacy, become an important international organization
begs the question of how even an initially modestly empowered body could be
conceived in today’s world. This is the threshold question to which I will now
turn. Of the four alternative approaches I will consider, the first and perhaps
most obvious one is to amend the United Nations Charter to create a
parliament as part of the United Nations. The second approach is for the
General Assembly of the United Nations to create the parliament pursuant to
its powers under the United Nations Charter to establish “subsidiary organs.”
The third approach is for civil society on its own initiative to create the
parliament outside of official United Nations or interstate treaty processes.
Finally, the fourth approach is for willing states to enter into a stand-alone
treaty creating the parliament.
III. THE FOUR APPROACHES TO ESTABLISHING A GPA
A. Amendment of the United Nations Charter
Pursuant to Article 108 of the United Nations Charter, amendments to the
Charter require approval by a two-thirds vote of the United Nations General
Assembly and subsequent ratification by two-thirds of the members of the
United Nations, including all of the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council.3 Article 109 of the Charter somewhat less onerously
allows for a Charter review conference to be established by a two-thirds vote
of the General Assembly and an affirmative vote of any nine members of the
fifteen-member Security Council.4 Any alteration of the Charter coming out
of the review conference, however, must similarly be approved by two-thirds
of the conference and ratified by two-thirds of the United Nations
membership including all of the permanent members of the Security Council.5
3. U.N. Charter art. 108.
4. Id. at art. 109, para. 1.
5. Id. at art. 109, para. 2.
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Amendment of the United Nations Charter pursuant to Articles 108 and
109 provide what might be called the classical route to creating a GPA. This
was the approach adopted by early world federalists such as Louis Sohn and
Grenville Clark in their 1958 book World Peace Through World Law, which
includes an elected parliament as part of their scheme to turn the United
Nations into a limited world government.6 While the currents of historical
change are not always predictable, the political barriers that are likely to stand
in the way of such an approach would appear formidable. The mixed results
of the United Nations’ most recent experience in 2005 with significant reform
showed just how politically difficult the U.N. reform process can be.7 Even
getting a proposal for a parliament on the United Nations reform agenda
would be a difficult task. For example, neither of the two reports written for
the Secretary General in advance of the 2005 reforms—the Report of the Panel of
Eminent Persons on United Nations Civil Society Relations8 and the Report of the
Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change9—mentioned
an elected chamber of the United Nations.
Also, significantly none of the 2005 reforms, which have been
implemented, have required amending the United Nations Charter. Clearly,
convincing two-thirds of the organization’s membership to approve amending
the Charter to create a parliament would not be easy, and ratification by that
number of states would even be more difficult. Finally, securing the
affirmative votes of all of the veto-welding members of the Security Council,
given the reluctance of some of these countries to support progressive
international initiatives, would likely be quite difficult. Perhaps, however, as
Joseph Preston Baratta has suggested in The Politics of World Federation, the
permanent member veto would not have to be the final word. He finds
inspiration in the observation that the delegates to the United States
Constitutional Convention of 1787 provided for ratification by nine of the
thirteen states, instead of unanimously, as required by the Articles of
Confederation. Perhaps, if the politics was auspicious, the international
community would accept a U.N. Charter review conference providing that a
new Charter go into effect despite a permanent member veto.10
While creating the political will to amend the U.N. Charter would be very
difficult, even assuming the problem of the veto could be dealt with, a GPA
initiated by way of Charter reform would likely be accepted as the most
legitimate.

6. GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW:
TWO ALTERNATIVE PLANS xlii-xliii (3d ed. enlarged 2d prtg. 1967) (1958).
7. See U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/60/355 (Sept. 14, 2005).
8. See U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004).
9. U.N. GOAR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
10. 1 JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, THE POLITICS OF WORLD FEDERATION: UNITED
NATIONS, UN REFORM, ATOMIC CONTROL 16 (2004).

352

Widener Law Review

[Vol. 13:347

B. Creation by the United Nations General Assembly as a Subsidiary Organ
Article 22 of the United Nations Charter empowers the General Assembly
to “establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance
of its functions.”11 The proposal that the General Assembly acting under
Article 22 create a parliamentary assembly as a “subsidiary organ” has been
suggested on several occasions over the years. For example, Erskine Childers
and Brian Urquhart endorsed this approach in their 1994 book, Renewing the
United Nations System.12 Recently it has been proposed by the Committee for a
Democratic U.N.13 The idea is attractive in that it provides a way around the
cumbersome United Nations Charter amendment process, but it is not
without political difficulties of its own.
Whether a parliament can be properly characterized as a subsidiary organ of
the General Assembly and whether it can be properly deemed necessary for the
performance of its functions14 is legally questionable in that the parliament would
not be answerable to that body. Indeed, the entire rationale for a parliament is
to introduce into global decision making an independent popularly
representative body. While the General Assembly has in the past, established
autonomous entities such as the United Nations University, none of its
creations have been intended to be an independent source of political
authority. The International Court of Justice has opined in the 1987 United
Nations Administrative Tribunal advisory opinion that the General Assembly
cannot delegate powers to a subsidiary organ that it does not itself possess or
are not implied as consistent with the overall structure of the Charter.15 Since
the General Assembly does not have the power to represent directly the
citizens of the world, and the United Nations is structured under the Charter
as an interstate organization, opponents of the project could challenge the
General Assembly’s powers to create a parliament.
Regardless, however, of the General Assembly’s actual legal authority to
create a parliament, the United Nations has no institutional mechanism to
prevent a resolute Assembly from acting. Rather, in a political conflict where
more than a few governments will oppose the General Assembly’s creation of
a parliament as a perceived threat to their power, legal arguments would
become fodder in the political debate. Of significance in determining whether
11. U.N. Charter art. 22.
12. ERSKINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS
SYSTEM (1994).
13. ANDREAS BUMMEL, COMMITTE FOR A DEMOCRATIC U.N., DEVELOPING
INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: FOR A PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 75
(2005) (Strategy Paper), http://www.uno-Komitee.de/en/documents/unpa-paper.pdf.
14. U.N. Charter art. 22 (emphasis added).
15. The Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J.47 (July 13), case summary available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=113&code=unac&p1=3&p2=4&case=21&k=d
2&p3=5.
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the parliament’s opponents would prevail is whether the decision by the
General Assembly to create a parliament would be regarded as an “important
question” under Article 18 of the Charter requiring a two-thirds as opposed to
majority vote.16 While Article 18 specifies certain voting matters as important
questions,17 additional unspecified matters are also according to its terms
important questions, but there is a surprising lack of precedent on which other
matters qualify. Specifically for our purposes, as most subsidiary organs have
been approved by consensus, the requisite vote required for their
establishment is unclear.
Whichever majority is required, however, the overall decision-making
structure of the United Nations does not favor the forces of institutional
change. Guardians of the status quo have historically enjoyed great success in
keeping reform proposals from gaining enough initial traction to appear on the
General Assembly’s agenda. Most initiatives have quietly died in committees
or have otherwise been buried in bureaucracy.
A related problem is that the need to gain the requisite support within the
General Assembly for the establishment of a parliament suggests the need for
problematic political concessions. For example, presumably responding at
least in part to such concerns, the Committee for a Democratic U.N. proposes
in its paper that its parliamentary assembly be composed initially of
representatives of national parliaments with direct popular elections to occur
at an indefinite time in the future18 and that all U.N. member states could send
representatives to the parliament, regardless of whether they come from a
legitimately democratically elected parliament.19
There is nothing inherently wrong with beginning as a parliament of
parliamentarians. In fact, in favor of this approach is the weight of historical
example. The European Parliament, the most successful example of the
creation of a transnational parliament, began that way in the earliest days of
European integration and fulfilled its promise to convert to direct popular
election in 1979.20 Yet, there are dangers in this approach. As has happened
16. U.N. Charter art. 18, para. 2.
17. These questions include:
recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace
and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security
Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council,
the election of members of the Trusteeship Council . . . the admission of
new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and
privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to
the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.
Id.

18. BUMMEL, supra note 13, at 78-79.
19. Id. at 90-91.
20. The founding treaties of what later become the European Union provided that
members should be initially appointed to the parliament by their own national parliaments, but
that direct elections should occur at a time in the future when the European Council adopts
appropriate arrangements. See DAVID JUDGE & DAVID EARNSHAW, THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT 26-44 (2003). For the most important organic treaty, see Treaty Establishing the
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in other interparliamentary bodies, national parliamentarians may come to feel
a sense of ownership in the parliament and be reluctant to promote the
evolution toward independent elections. And, every day that elections are
extended will delay the growth in the parliament’s political influence. Without
the public ritual of popular elections to draw publicity and legitimize the
parliament, the organization would be unlikely to be noticed. Also, with the
national parliamentary representatives’ job security dependent upon reelection
to their own national parliaments, their day jobs will remain their primary
focus. Unlike parliamentarians who are elected specifically to serve in the
GPA, national parliamentarians would not see their careers and reputations as
tied to building the growth and influence of that organization. Instead, for
them it will be primarily a networking forum where issues of common
concerns can be discussed with colleagues from other national parliaments.
More troubling is the suggestion that all U.N. member states, regardless of
whether they possess democratically elected parliaments, send representatives
to the United Nations Parliament. This would undermine the credibility of the
organization and compromise its ability to act as an alternative to
authoritarianism.
C. Civil Society Organized Elections
The third approach to creating a GPA is for major actors from international
civil society to establish a provisional structure for the parliament themselves
and to organize and carry out elections. If this approach were followed, the
parliament would start as an unofficial body and its empowerment would be
reliant exclusively upon its unique claim to a popular mandate described
above.
This is the strategy for creating the parliament that my colleague Professor
Richard Falk and I first proposed when we began advocating for a GPA.21 It
European Community art. 19, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf. The European Parliament first
submitted a draft convention for direct popular elections in 1960, but the European Council did
not adopt it or forward it to the member states. By 1974, the problems caused by
representatives having dual mandates (to their own parliaments and to the European
Parliament) had become increasingly apparent, and the Parliament submitted a revised draft
convention, which was adopted in 1976. See SCHELTO PATIJN, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, POL.
AFF. COMM. RAPPORTEUR, ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL
SUFFRAGE 11-12 (1974) (Draft Convention with Explanatory Statement), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/5184/01/000478_1.pdf; as adopted, COUNCIL DECISION AND ACT
CONCERNING THE ELECTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY
DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, (Sept. 20, 1976), available at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de
/europawahl2004/downloads/decisionandact.pdf.
21. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000); Andrew Strauss &
Richard Falk, For a Global Peoples’ Assembly, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 14, 1997, available at
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/1997/11/14/edstraus.t.php.
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is also the approach suggested by George Monbiot in his book A Manifesto for
a New World Order.22 As we explained in the year 2000 in the Stanford Journal of
International Law:
[A] GPA need not be established by a traditional inter-state treaty arrangement.
Globalization has generated an emergent global civil society composed of
transnational business, labor, media, religious and issue oriented citizen
advocacy networks with an expanding independent capacity to initiate and
validate a GPA.
....
. . . Uniquely, a GPA would have a claim to authority independent of
whether or not it received the formal blessings of the state system.23

To begin such a civil society initiating process one might envision a call
emanating from a panel of political and moral authority figures, such as former
heads of state, Nobel Peace Prize winners and major religious figures. If a
critical mass of respectable civil society organizations responded positively to
this call, the panel could oversee a series of civil society meetings culminating
in a final conference whose purpose would be to adopt a political framework
for the parliament’s creation. Civil society would then have the task of
organizing and holding elections. Presumably, elections would occur in all
countries where they were not banned and political conditions allowed for free
campaigning.
Needless to say, all of this would be extremely difficult to implement both
politically and logistically. Civil society is inchoate and has no preexisting
structure for making collective decisions. Putting in place the decision-making
process for less ambitious projects such as the World Social Forum has been
difficult and contentious,24 and that project in particular has worked largely
because its decentralized nature has kept the need for common decision
making to a minimum.25 Creating out of whole cloth a widely agreed upon
decision-making structure, capable of resolving such politically fraught topics
as provisional voting formulas and electoral districts would be daunting, even
for a skilled panel of authority figures.
22. GEORGE MONBIOT, THE AGE OF CONSENT: A MANIFESTO FOR A NEW WORLD
ORDER 88-98 (2003).
23. Falk & Strauss, supra note 21, at 194, 206-207 (citation omitted).
24. For a discussion of the early organization of the Forum, see Naomi Klein, A Fete
for the End of The End of History, THE NATION, Mar. 19, 2001, at 19, 22. (“The organizational
structure of the forum was so opaque that it was nearly impossible to figure out how decisions
were made or to find ways to question those decisions. There were no open plenaries and no
chance to vote on the structure of future events. In the absence of a transparent process, fierce
NGO brand wars were waged behind the scenes . . . .”); see also Teivo Teivainen, World Social
Forum: What Should It Be when It Grows up?, OPENDEMOCRACY, July 10, 2003, at 3,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/1342.pdf.
25. The World Social Forum allows civil society organizations to self-organize their
own events under the umbrella of the Forum.
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The project may become more politically manageable by substituting
initiation of the GPA by existing political parties for civil society as a whole.
While also lacking a process for making collective political decisions, such
parties, numbering far fewer than civil society organizations in general, are
likely to be less unwieldy. In addition, they already provide the infrastructure
for electoral politics and might look favorably on an opportunity to expand
their arena. Regardless, however, of which nongovernmental organizing
entities were to take the initiative to begin the parliament, the barriers to
reaching agreement and acting on that agreement are significant.
Finally, funding would have to be secured to underwrite the cost of the
elections and the initiation of the parliament. If the costs of domestic
elections and operating expenses of existing parliaments are a guide, the sums
would greatly exceed the amounts that have thus far been devoted by the
nongovernmental sector to international political initiatives.
D. An Interstate Treaty Process
Finally, a GPA could be established by way of a stand-alone treaty agreed to
by whichever internationally progressive countries were willing to be pioneers.
Even twenty to thirty economically and geographically diverse countries would
be enough to found the parliament. The treaty agreed to by these countries
would establish the legal structure for elections to be held within their
territories including a voting system and electoral districts. In addition, an
operational framework for the parliament, including its mandate and
limitations on its powers would be included in the treaty as would a provision
for future accession by other countries. Any country could later join the
parliament so long as it was willing to meet its obligations under the treaty, the
most important of which would be to allow its citizens to vote representatives
to the Parliament in free and fair elections.26
A stand-alone treaty organization whose membership may not be the same
as the United Nations is not a novel concept. Most major international bodies
such as the Bretton Woods organizations, the World Trade Organization and
the World Health Organization, to name but a few, have been created in this
way. Most significant, this approach was used to establish the International
Criminal Court, whose membership famously does not include the United
States, nor for that matter Russia or China (though Russia is a signatory).27 In
the case of the International Criminal Court, specific treaty provisions align
that organization’s processes with those of the United Nations. Most
26. Professor Falk and I have developed this argument in several places, including
Foreign Affairs and The Nation. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, 80
FOREIGN AFF. 212 (2001); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward a Global Parliament, THE
NATION, Sep. 22, 2003, at 28.
27. International Criminal Court, Establishment of the Court, http://www.icccpi.int/about/ataglance/establishment.html.
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significant are terms providing for the Security Council to refer criminal cases
to the Court.
Likewise, the GPA treaty could also include provisions defining its initial
role vis a vis the United Nations, and once established the parliament could
enter into a relationship agreement with that body.28 It would be important to
be clear that the parliament, though begun independent of the United Nations,
was meant to strengthen, and not replace, that organization. Part of the
Parliament’s treaty-based responsibilities, for example, could be to weigh in
with its own vote on certain specified categories of United Nations General
Assembly resolutions. General Assembly resolutions are themselves largely
recommendatory, and by insinuating a democratic voice into the process, the
resolutions that passed both bodies would be more noticed and deemed more
legitimate. Backed by the weight of popular authority over time, perhaps the
General Assembly and the GPA could evolve together into a truly bicameral
legislative system capable of producing binding legislation.
This approach to creating a GPA by interstate treaty process is the one that
Richard Falk and I have come to promote as the most promising. It offers
strategic advantages as compared to either of the two proposals for creating
the Parliament through the machinery of the United Nations. Even under the
second relatively less cumbersome process of the General Assembly voting to
create the parliament as a subsidiary organ, a core group of sponsoring
countries would have to overcome a formidable combination of bureaucracy,
indifference and opposition to gain traction within the United Nations. Under
the stand-alone treaty approach, however, power would shift to those
countries that are willing to proceed on their own. No one could stop them.
And once it became clear that the GPA treaty initiative had left the station, it
would likely gain momentum as other less proactive countries would have an
incentive to take part rather than be sidelined in the creation of an important
new international organization.
Beyond this strategic leveraging of support, countries that are truly
supportive of the GPA’s democratic mission are likely to create the best, most
democratic organization. They would not be forced to make the kinds of
antidemocratic concessions that passage by the United Nations might require.
28. The U.N. Charter provides that: “The Economic and Social Council may enter
into agreements with any” agency “established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide
international responsibilities.” U.N. Charter art. 63, para. 1; id. at art. 57, para. 1. These
agreements “defin[e] the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into
relationship with the United Nations[,]” and “shall be subject to approval by the General
Assembly.” U.N. Charter art. 63, para. 1. Relationship agreements typically provide for the
exchange of information, common facilities and assistance, cooperation in financial and
administrative matters, and the mode of debate and agenda setting. See U.N. Joint Inspection
Unit, Relationship Agreements Between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies: Review and
Strengthening of Sections Pertaining to the Common System of Salaries, Allowances, and Conditions of Service,
U.N. Doc JIU/REP/93/3 (1993), available at http://www.unsystem.org/jiu/data/reports/
1993/en93_03.pdf. Relationship agreements may also reaffirm the independence of the
organization entering into relationship with the United Nations, as did the International
Criminal Court in its relationship agreement with the U.N. International Criminal Court,
International Cooperation, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/cooperation.html.
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Later, if a critical mass of countries were to join the parliament, there might
come a time when it would be politically untenable for holdout governments
to deny their people the right to vote in the only globally elected body. At that
point those governments would not be in a position to compromise the
integrity of the organization, but would have to join the GPA on its own
democratic terms.
Finally, relative to civil society organizing elections, an interstate treaty
process does not suffer from the absence of a decision-making structure that
would undermine the ability of nongovernmental organizations to act
collectively. States have a long-accepted and highly defined collaborative
process for entering into treaty arrangements, including those establishing new
international organizations. Also, state sanction for the GPA by way of treaty
would confer an additional layer of legitimacy upon the organization, and
states have access to the resources to finance the project that civil society
lacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
We all belong to multiple geographical communities, local, provincial,
national and international. People who consider themselves committed
democrats often take it as a first principle of politics that all of these
communities should be organized along democratic lines—all that is except
for the international whose democratic failings many commonly overlook. In
the age of globalization this exception is anachronistic and dysfunctional. It
means that the normal dynamics of parliamentary politics stop at water’s edge.
In domestic democratic politics parliamentary coalitions are fluid, and while
they are affected by party loyalties and discipline, such coalitions transcend
geographical boundaries. Parliamentarians, representing voting constituencies,
stand with some colleagues on some issues and other colleagues on other
issues regardless of from where they hail.
In the international system, on the other hand, all of the citizens of a certain
nationality, and/or within a certain geographical area, are part of a permanent
coalition frozen into the institutional mold of the state. This permanent
coalition in theory, and largely in practice, speaks with one voice in
international affairs. It doesn’t matter that citizens within the state may find
that on certain global issues their political affinities or interests match more
closely with the positions taken by other states.
This structure gives those who capture political control of the permanent
coalition that is the state the ability to wage war. At their disposal is the
capacity to field organized armed forces fueled by nationalist sentiment.
Parliamentary coalitions, on the other hand, because of their constantly
changing conditional composition are not centrally controlled, and do not
engender nationalistic feelings of group identity, nor do they field armies.
While violence can break out within the context of a parliamentary system, it is
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antithetical to, rather than consistent with, the structure of that system, a
system which is after all dedicated to the principle of irenic decision making.
In this article I have tried to explore concretely how such a parliamentary
system might be introduced into the global arena. With the understanding that
what is feasible and practical is highly contingent upon unknown political
developments, my goal has been to present what amounts to an historical
work-in-progress rather than final conclusions. As David Kennedy has, for
example, argued elsewhere in this volume “rupturing historical forces” could
dramatically change the political context in which we are operating. What
seems highly improbable now may seem suddenly possible, or what seems
possible now may seem suddenly highly improbable. The challenge, which I
have tried to meet in this article, and the ongoing challenge for all of us who
wish to contribute to making the global system more democratic, is to
continue to adopt our ideas, strategies and practices to a global political
context which is constantly evolving. Then, it can be hoped that, as
opportunities present themselves, we will be ready.

